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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, 
Appellant, 
v. 
FRED VANDERVEUR, 
Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case # 990178-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a ruling of the Eighth District Court, Uintah County, State of 
Utah, Hon. John R. Anderson, denying Mr. Tippett's Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
and Determination of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. This court has jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3(a) 
of the Utah Rules Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code 77-18a-1(1998). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
The appellant, Mr. Tippett, seeks a review of the Eighth District Court's order 
denying his Petition for Post Conviction Relief and Determination of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel. Mr. Tippett raises the following issues on appeal: 
ISSUES 
1) The trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying Mr. Tippett's Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief and for Determination of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
2) The trial court erred by failing to enter written findings necessary to 
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim as required by Rule 23B of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1) Issues raised should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. "In 
most cases, [w]e review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw guilty plea under an 
abuse of discretion standard." State v. Blair. 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993). 
Consequently, "[T]he trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with its decision 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Id See also State v. Penman. 964 
P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah Ct.App.1998). However, "if the trial court failed to strictly 
comply with Rule 11 . . . in taking the defendant's guilty plea, the trial court has exceeded 
its permitted range of discretion as a matter of law." State v. Mills. 898 P.2d 819, 821 
(Utah Ct.App. 1995). 
2) Issues raised are questions of fact and questions of law. "We review the trial 
court['s] factual findings . . . for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness." State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 345 Utah Adv.Rep. 7,8 (Utah 1998). 
"When reviewing the denial of a motion for new trial based on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, we defer to the trial court's findings unless clearly erroneous, 
but remain "free to make an independent determination of a trial court's conclusions." 
2 
State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Accord State V. Wright. 893 P.2d 
1113, 1119(UtahCt.App.l995). 
3) Issues raised are questions of law and should be reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutions, statutory provisions, or rules referenced in this 
brief and pertinent to the issues now before the court on appeal are contained herein or 
attached to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Tippett was originally charged on February 18, 1986, with two counts of 
aggravated kidnaping in violation of Utah Code §76-5-302 and two counts of a firearm 
enhancement in violation of Utah Code §76-5-203. As part of a plea agreement and on 
his counsel's advice, Mr. Tippett pled guilty to one count of a aggravated kidnaping and a 
firearm enhancement with the stipulated dismissal of the two remaining charges. On 
March 26, 1986, Mr. Tippett was sentenced by Judge Boyd Bunnell to serve 15 years to 
life for the aggravated kidnaping conviction along with a 5 to 10 year term, to be served 
consecutively, for the firearm enhancement. 
On June 9, 1994, Mr. Tippett filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea based on 
several issues including the trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and that the State's charging 
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document was fatally flawed as it failed to allege an offense. On June 29, 1994, Judge 
John R. Anderson of the Eighth District Court issued a summary ruling denying Mr. 
Tippett's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on all aspects except for Mr. Tippett's claim 
that the trial court had offered an inadequate and misleading explanation of the firearm 
enhancement. The court directed the State to respond to Mr. Tippett's claim regarding 
this issue. The State submitted a response and without allowing Mr. Tippett a chance to 
respond, Judge Anderson denied the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea in its entirety. Mr. 
Tippett sought an appeal of Judge Anderson's ruling. On July 25, 1994, Mr. Tippett filed 
a Pro Se Notice of Appeal. Mr. Tippett then proceeded with his appeal without the 
assistance of counsel. On September 13, 1994, Mr. Tippett filed a Request for 
Appointment of Counsel. On October 26, 1994, attorney Allan Williams was appointed 
by the court to represent Mr. Tippett in his appeal of the denial of his Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea. The Supreme Court set a deadline for the filing of Appellant's brief as 
January 5, 1995. On January 11, 1995, the Supreme Court entered an Order of Dismissal 
on the grounds that Mr. Tippett's counsel had failed to file Appellant's brief prior to the 
assigned filing deadline. On January 20, 1995, Allan Williams filed the Brief of 
Appellant and on January 31, 1995 the Supreme Court reinstated Mr. Tippett's appeal. 
Despite having agreed to allow the Mr. Tippett to see a copy of the brief prior to 
filing it, Mr. Williams did not provide Mr. Tippett with a copy of the brief before he filed 
it and did not even inform Mr. Tippett that his brief had been filed. Mr. Tippett made 
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numerous calls to Mr. Williams office and wrote him letters requesting an update on his 
appeal and a copy of the brief but received no response. Finally, on May 8, 1995, Mr. 
Tippett wrote a letter to the Supreme Court setting forth his concerns regarding Mr. 
Williams' representation and requesting a copy of the appeal brief filed by Mr. Williams. 
Upon receiving a copy of the brief from the Court of Appeals, Mr. Tippett 
discovered that the brief filed by Mr. Williams fail to set forth several issues he had asked 
Mr. Williams to include in the brief, and which Mr. Williams had agreed to include, as 
well as having changed the factual and theoretical substance of another issue rendering 
what was once a viable appellate issue to be without merit. Additionally, Mr. Williams 
failed to adequately brief the issues he did include in the brief he filed on Mr. Tippett's 
behalf. The brief filed by Mr. Williams failed to provide adequate case law in support of 
Mr. Tippett's claims, and failed to offer record citations or other evidence which would 
support Mr. Tippett's claims. As such, Mr. Tippett filed a Motion for Leave to File an 
Amended or Supplemental Brief and a Motion for Substitution of Counsel on May 29, 
1995, along with a Memorandum in Support of each Motion. On June 15, 1995 the State 
filed a Response to these motions which supported Mr. Tippett's claims that Mr. 
Williams failed to adequately present the appellate issues and that Mr. Tippett be allowed 
to file a supplemental brief or that the Motion for Substitution of Counsel be granted. On 
June 21,1995, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Order denying Mr. Tippett's Motion 
for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief but temporarily remanded the case back to the 
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Eighth District Court for consideration of Mr. Tippett's Motion for Substitution of 
Counsel. On July 5, 1995, Mr. Tippett filed a Notice of Dismissal of Counsel, dismissing 
Mr. Williams as his counsel. On August 31, 1995, after reviewing Mr. Tippett's Motion 
for Substitution of Counsel, the State's Response to the Motion for Substitution of 
Counsel, and the Court of Appeal's Order denying Mr. Tippett's Motion to File a 
Supplemental Brief, Judge Anderson of the Eighth District Court entered a Ruling 
denying Mr. Tippett's Motion for Substitution of Counsel. On September 17, 1995, Mr. 
Tippett filed a Motion for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Determination and 
Withdrawal of Appeal Brief and Memorandum in Support, alleging that Mr Williams' 
representation was ineffective and that Mr. Williams was laboring under a conflict of 
interest which prevented him from adequately representing him in his appeal. 
Following the District Court's Ruling denying Mr. Tippett's Motion for 
Substitution of Counsel, on September 22, 1995, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an 
order granting Mr. Tippett permission to file a supplemental brief to supplement the brief 
filed earlier by Mr. Williams. Based on this Order allowing Mr. Tippett to file a 
supplemental brief, the Utah Court of Appeals on October 5, 1995, entered an Order 
denying Mr. Tippett's Motion for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Request to 
Withdraw Appeal Brief stating it was moot. On that same day Mr. Tippett filed in the 
Eighth District Court a Renewed Motion for Appointment of Appellate Counsel and 
Notice to Submit for Decision. On October 13, 1995, Judge Anderson of the Eighth 
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District Court issued a Ruling granting Mr. Tippett's Renewed Motion for Appointment 
of Counsel stating that counsel would be appointed to assist Mr. Tippett in his appeal and 
that counsel would be selected at random from a list of available counsel in the Salt Lake 
City area. The Uintah County Attorney, Joann B. Stringham, then filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration stating that the State did not object to the appointment of new counsel to 
represent Mr. Tippett but that rather than appoint counsel from Salt Lake the court should 
appoint attorney John Beaslin who had a contract with Uintah County to provide two 
appeals per year. On October 20, 1995, Judge Anderson issued a Ruling stating that the 
Court's Ruling of October 13, 1995, regarding the appointment of new counsel for Mr. 
Tippett would stand. Mr. Tippett then filed a Motion to Stay the proceedings in the Court 
of Appeals until new counsel had been appointed and the motion was granted by Order of 
the Utah Court of Appeals on October 23, 1995. Then on January 11, 1996, due to an 
apparent lack of available attorneys and without conducting an inquiry into the alleged 
conflict of interest involving Allan Williams, Judge Anderson rescinded the Court's 
October 13, 1995 Order granting Mr. Tippett new counsel, and reinstated the Court's 
original Order of August 31, 1995 denying Mr. Tippett's Motion for Substitution of 
Counsel and ordered that Mr. Williams continue to represent Mr. Tippett in his appeal. 
After being reassigned to the case, Allan Williams filed a Supplemental Brief on April 1, 
1996. Once again Mr. Williams did not provide Mr. Tippett with a copy of the brief nor 
did he discuss the brief with him prior to filing it. Again Mr. Williams brief was deficient 
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in that it failed to include all of the pertinent facts, trial citations, or evidence in support of 
Mr. Tippett's claims. After discovering that the second brief had been filed, Mr. Tippett 
attempted to submit a Memorandum of Law to Supplement the Appeal Brief but the Utah 
Court of Appeals would not accept the memorandum. 
On October 3, 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision. 
The decision affirmed the denial of Mr. Tippett's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea but did 
recognize the trial court's error in its explanation of the firearm enhancement and failure 
to properly inform Mr. Tippett of the maximum sentence that could be imposed for the 
firearm enhancement conviction. The Court of Appeals modified Mr. Tippett's sentence 
for the firearm enhancement from 5 to 10 years consecutively to the 1 to 5 year term that 
was explained to him by the trial court prior to entering his guilty plea. 
Despite the fact that the Utah Court of Appeals had rendered its decision on 
October 3, 1995, Mr. Tippett was totally unaware of the court's decision in his case and 
was under the impression that his case was set for oral argument. Mr. Tippett was 
notified of the court's decision only after he wrote a letter to the Court of Appeals 
requesting a copy of the State's Response Brief. At no time had Mr. Williams notified 
Mr. Tippett of the court's decision nor had he provided Mr. Tippett with a copy of the 
decision. In fact, Mr. Tippett had made numerous attempts to contact Mr. Williams to 
discuss the status of the appeal and the upcoming oral argument (it was Mr. Tippett's 
belief that his case was to be set for oral argument) but Mr. Williams failed to respond to 
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any of Mr. Tippett's communications. It was not until he received a letter from the Court 
of Appeals dated January 13, 1997 along with a copy of the court's Memorandum 
Decision that Mr. Tippett became aware that his case had been decided and that the trial 
court's ruling was affirmed except for the change in the firearm enhancement sentence. 
Again on January 29, 1997, Mr. Tippett filed a Notice of Dismissal dismissing Mr. 
Williams as his counsel. Mr. Tippett then filed a Pro Se Motion for Leave to File a 
Petition for Rehearing and a Petition for Rehearing on January 29, 1997. The State filed a 
response to Mr. Tippett's pro se pleadings and the Utah Court of Appeals responded by 
advising Mr. Tippett that the Court of Appeals no longer had jurisdiction and that a 
remittitur was issued transferring jurisdiction back to the Eighth District Court. 
On September 23, 1997, Mr. Tippett filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
based on numerous issues, including the fact that he had received ineffective assistance of 
counsel from Mr. Williams, along with a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. The Court 
then appointed Robert C. Lunnen to represent Mr. Tippett who has since been substituted 
by Mr. Tippett's current counsel, Julie George. The State filed a response to Mr. 
Tippett's Petition for Post Conviction relief and on April 14, 1998, Judge Anderson of the 
Eighth District Court issued a Ruling dismissing all of Mr. Tippett's claims except for the 
issue of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel, Allan Williams. Subsequent to this 
Ruling, the Court held an Evidentiary Hearing on September 23, 1998, at the conclusion 
of which the court directed both counsel to prepare a memorandum in support of their 
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respective positions on Mr. Tippett's Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Both parties 
submitted a Memorandum in Support of their respective positions and on February 8, 
1999, Judge Anderson issued a two sentence Ruling denying the Appellant's Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief and for Determination of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. (See 
attached copy of Ruling dated February 8, 1999-Exhibit A) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief seeking to have his conviction 
for aggravated kidnaping with a firearm enhancement overturned citing numerous 
deficiencies in the court's acceptance of his guilty plea and subsequent sentencing, in 
addition to Appellant's claim that Allan Williams, court appointed appellate counsel for 
the Appellant, provided Appellant with ineffective assistance of counsel in his 
representation of Appellant in his appeal of the trial court's denial of his Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea. A Ruling was issued by Judge Anderson of the Eighth District 
Court on April 14, 1998, stating that the only issue remaining for determination or 
disposition was the issue of whether or not Appellant's appellate counsel, Allan Williams, 
was ineffective. On February 8, 1999, Judge Anderson issued a two sentence Ruling 
denying the Appellant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief and Determination of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. This ruling failed to set forth the specific findings 
necessary to a determination of ineffective assistance of counsel as required by Rule 23B 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In addition to his claim of ineffective 
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assistance of counsel, Mr. Tippett also claimed that Mr. Williams was laboring under a 
conflict of interest which adversely affected his ability to adequately represent Mr. 
Tippett in his appeal thus prejudicing his case and ultimately resulting in his conviction 
being affirmed and his appeal being dismissed. As such, it is necessary to include in this 
appeal argument on numerous issues not included in the Brief of Appellant filed by Allan 
Williams, in order to demonstrate Mr. Williams' ineffective assistance and the court's 
abuse of discretion in denying the Appellant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief and 
Determination of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING THE APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF AND 
FOR DETERMINATION OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying Mr. Tippett's Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief and for Determination of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The 
Appellant argues that based upon the following issues as presented to the court in 
Appellant's Memorandum in Support, the Petition should have been granted and the trial 
court abused its discretion when it denied the Petition. These issues must be reviewed by 
this court due to the fact that the trial court failed to enter specific findings as required by 
Rule 23 B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, in order to make a 
determination as to whether or not the trial court abused its discretion when denying the 
Appellant's Petition, the Appellant requests that this court review the following issues 
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and "make an independent determination of [the] trial court's conclusions" pursuant to 
the Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
1) ALLAN WILLIAMS WAS LABORING UNDER A CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST THAT COMPROMISED HIS REPRESENTATION OF APPELLANT AND 
ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF APPELLANT'S APPEAL. 
It is Appellant's claim that Allan Williams was laboring under a conflict of interest 
due to time constraints, his duty to his private clients, and inadequate compensation, 
which effectively prevented Mr. Williams from providing Mr. Tippett with the effective 
assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. During the entire course of Mr. Tippett's appeal, in which Mr. Williams 
acted as his counsel for a period of nearly two years, Mr. Williams visited with Mr. 
Tippett in person at the prison on only two occasions for a combined total of 
approximately 40 to 45 minutes. In his own testimony on September 23, 1998, Mr. 
Williams stated when asked about his normal routine with regard to trips to the prison to 
visit clients that "I usually plan on an hour to an hour and-a-half is the normal visit." 
(See September 23, 1998 hearing transcript page 93 (Tr. 632-727)-attached as Exhibit B) 
In the two visits Mr. Williams had with Mr. Tippett he spent only a fraction of his 
"normal visit" time with Mr. Tippett. The first visit took place shortly after Allan 
Williams was appointed by the court to represent Mr. Tippett. The visit lasted only 15 to 
20 minutes, the majority of which was spent by Mr. Williams introducing himself, but 
Mr. Tippett was able to outline for Mr. Williams the issues he wanted Mr. Williams to 
12 
include in his appeal. Mr. Williams agreed to draft the brief as Mr. Tippett had requested 
and he further agreed that he would return to meet with Mr. Tippett for a more extended 
visit at which time he would allow Mr. Tippett to review the brief prior to filing it. Mr. 
Williams never returned to the prison nor did he communicate in any way with Mr. 
Tippett prior to filing the Brief of Appellant. Due to Mr. Williams' refusal to come to the 
prison to meet with him, Mr. Tippett made numerous attempts to contact Mr. Williams by 
phone, making 8 or 9 calls to Mr. Williams office over a two month period. Discouraged 
by the fact that he was unable to reach Mr. Williams, Mr. Tippett scheduled several phone 
conferences with Mr. Williams' secretary. Mr. Williams kept only one of these 
appointments. This was the only opportunity Mr. Tippett had to speak with Mr. Williams 
and he only spoke with Mr. Williams for approximately 6 to 7 minutes before Mr. 
Williams told him he had to go because he was busy with other clients. 
Frustrated by his inability to speak with Mr. Williams in person or by phone, Mr. 
Tippett then resorted to sending letters to Mr. Williams. His first letter went unanswered. 
Then after writing a second letter Mr. Williams responded by sending Mr. Tippett a copy 
of the State's Brief of Appellee. Only after receiving a copy of State's Brief did Mr. 
Tippett discover that Mr. Williams had already filed his brief. At no time did Mr. 
Williams allow Mr. Tippett to review the brief prior to filing as he had agreed to do nor 
had he even taken the time to notify Mr. Tippett that the brief had been filed. Mr. 
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Williams testified during the Evidentiary Hearing held on September 23, 1998 that "I [he] 
directed his secretary to do it [send a copy of the brief to Mr. Tippett] within the week, 
within a week or so after it was filed." (emphasis added) (See September 23, 1998 
hearing transcript page 79 (Tr. 632-727)-attached as Exhibit C) Mr. Williams had no 
intention of allowing Mr. Tippett to review the brief prior to filing it despite agreeing to 
provide Mr. Tippett with a copy of the brief so that he may review it prior to filing. 
In addition to failing to notify Mr. Tippett that the brief had been filed, Mr. 
Williams had failed to file the brief in a timely manner resulting in the Supreme Court's 
entry of an order dismissing Mr. Tippett's appeal for failure to file the Appellant's brief in 
the time permitted by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(a). Only after Mr. Williams 
filed the hastily prepared Brief of Appellant, which consisted of only seven pages, did the 
Supreme Court reinstate Mr. Tippett's appeal. Mr. Williams failure to file the brief on 
time nearly caused Mr. Tippett's appeal to be dismissed. Surely Mr. Tippett was 
reasonable in his expectation that the brief would be filed in a timely manner since that is 
the very least that could be expected of competent appellate counsel who is aware of the 
strict filing guidelines that must be adhered to during the appeals process. 
Mr. Williams failure to file the brief in a timely manner, his refusal to travel to the 
prison to meet with Mr. Tippett, and his refusal to communicate with Mr. Tippett by 
phone or by mail clearly demonstrates that Mr. Williams was not willing to put in the 
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time necessary to present an adequate appeal on Mr. Tippett's behalf. The fact that Mr. 
Williams filed a brief consisting of a mere 7 pages (See attached copy of First Brief of 
Appellant-Exhibit D), in a complex appeal with numerous viable appellate issues that 
were worthy of being briefed further supports Mr. Tippett's contention that Mr. Williams 
was more interested in spending his time working on cases involving private clients than 
he was in spending time on Mr. Tippett's case. After all, Mr. Williams was compensated 
at a much higher hourly rate for work done on his private cases than he was on the cases 
where he was appointed by the court and paid by the County. In contrast, the first Brief 
of Appellee filed by the State was of much greater length consisting of 21 pages. (See 
attached copy of First Brief of Appellee-Exhibit E). 
Mr. Williams, during the brief conversations he had with Mr. Tippett even stated 
that he was extremely busy with his private caseload and he was not able to spend as 
much time on Mr. Tippett's case as he would have liked. Rule 1.7 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct states in pertinent part that: 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or 
by the lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely 
affected; and . . . 
(See attached copy of Rule 1.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct-Exhibit F) 
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In the present case, it can easily be argued that Mr. Williams' responsibilities to his 
private clients adversely affected his representation of Mr. Tippett, an indigent client for 
which the hourly rate was much less than that of Mr. Williams private clients. Mr. 
Williams spent the majority if not nearly all of his time working on his private cases. 
Other than the small amount of time spent on drafting his lackluster appeal brief, Mr. 
Williams spent virtually no time on Mr. Tippett's case. He did not meet with him, speak 
to him, respond to his letters or even take the time to notify Mr. Tippett that his appeal 
brief had been filed. Likewise, it is impossible to believe that Mr. Williams 
representation of Mr. Tippett was not adversely affected by the lack of communication, 
lack of research, and overall lack of time spent preparing the Appellant's Brief. 
It appears that the underlying reason for Mr. Williams lack of interest and effort in 
Mr. Tippett's case is monetary. The majority of cases decided by the Utah Courts 
involving an alleged conflict of interest involve cases where one attorney represents 
multiple defendants whose interests are contrary to one another but, the Utah Supreme 
Court has previously addressed the issue that minimal compensation may result in a 
conflict of interest. In State v. Taylor. 947 P.2d 681, the Utah Supreme Court addressed 
Taylor's claim that his defense was inadequate and his counsel ineffective due to the fact 
that his court appointed attorney received only minimal compensation under the public 
defender contract he had with Summit County. (See attached copy of State v. Taylor-
16 
Exhibit G) In ruling that the public defender's minimal compensation did not constitute a 
conflict of interest, the Supreme Court noted that the public defender in question had 
outside sources of income other than the public defense contract he maintained with 
Summit County and that during the time he represented Taylor, this outside income 
provided between 80 and 90%of his gross income but that during this same time period, 
the public defender spent approximately 69% of his time working on Taylor's case. 
Nearly half of that time was spent consulting with Taylor and his parents. 
Truly, the opposite has occurred in Mr. Tippett's case. Mr. Williams virtually 
ignored Mr. Tippett's case and spent the vast majority of his time working on his own 
private cases while spending very little if any time working on Mr. Tippett's appeal. It 
can easily be assumed, based upon the apparent lack of time spent by Mr. Williams on 
Mr. Tippett's case, that Mr. Williams income during the time he represented Mr. Tippett 
came almost entirely from the income he earned from his private clients. Likewise, it 
would be an extremely generous estimate to say that Mr. Williams may have spent even 
as much as 5% of his time on Mr. Tippett's case of which virtually no time was spent 
communicating or consulting with Mr. Tippett. 
The right to be represented by counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution encompasses "the right to counsel free from conflicts of 
interest." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah.Ct.App. 1990) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. At 2064). Defendants who claim that they 
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received ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest must demonstrate 
that "an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler 
v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). "In order to 
establish an actual conflict, [the defendant] must demonstrate 'as a threshold matter . . . 
that the defense attorney was required to make a choice advancing his own interest to the 
detriment of his client's interests.'" United State v. Acevedo. 891 F. 2d 607, 610 (7th 
Cir.1989) (ellipsis in original) (quoting United States v. Horton. 845 F.2d 1414, 1419 (7th 
Cir.1988)). Once a defendant demonstrates an actual conflict, there is no need to show 
prejudice on ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon alleged conflict of 
interest. Cuyler at 349-350, 100 S.Ct. At 1718-1719. 
The minimal compensation Mr. Williams received for Mr. Tippett's case clearly 
affected his willingness to work on Mr. Tippett's appeal which is reflected in his lack of 
communication with Mr. Tippett, his overall poor performance, nearly causing Mr. 
Tippett's appeal to be dismissed by failing to file the brief on time, as well as by the 
inadequacies of the brief he eventually filed. Mr. Williams was forced to make a 
financial decision of whether to spend time working on Mr. Tippett's case which 
provided very minimal compensation under the public defender contract or to spend his 
time working on his private cases for which the compensation was much greater. From 
an economic standpoint it is clearly in Mr. Williams best interest financially to focus 
more of his time on his private cases, which is exactly what he did. This decision 
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advancing his own best interests was clearly to the detriment of Mr. Tippett. It can in no 
way be argued that Mr. Williams lack of communication with Mr. Tippett, his lack of 
research, and overall lack of time spent working on Mr. Tippett's appeal could possibly 
have benefitted Mr. Tippett's case. Instead, Mr. Williams decision to spend most of his 
time working on his private cases and little time working on Mr. Tippett's case adversely 
affected the outcome of Mr. Tippett's appeal. In this case it is obvious that the minimal 
compensation provided to Mr. Williams for his representation of Mr. Tippett caused an 
actual conflict of interest and therefore pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Cuyler. it must be presumed that Mr. Williams was ineffective. 
2) APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL. 
In Evitts v. Lucey. 469 U.S. 387, 104 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) the 
Supreme Court held that the Strickland1 standard for ineffective assistance of counsel also 
applies to appellate counsel. An attorney, once appointed, has a duty to represent his 
client with zeal and loyalty. The attorney's faithful discharge of that duty is so important 
that it is mandated not only by the Rules of Professional Conduct but also in criminal 
cases by the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Cronic. 466 U.S. 648, 656-657 
1
 Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984). This case set forth a two pronged standard for a determination of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective assistance under this standard a defendant 
must first demonstrate an obvious deficiency in counsel's performance and second that 
the effect of this deficiency was prejudicial. 
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(1984). Therefore an appellant can raise an ineffectiveness claim concerning an 
attorney's performance on appeal. See Williams v. Lockhart 849 F. 2d 1134, 1137-1138 
(8th Cir. 1988) 
Mr. Tippett contends that appellate counsel Allan Williams was generally 
ineffective in that (1) he failed to present and adequately brief and present two major 
appeal issues causing them to be dismissed as being without merit, (2) he improperly and 
against the will of the Mr. Tippett changed the factual and theoretical substance of a 
viable appeal issue causing it to be dismissed as being without merit, (3) he failed to brief 
and present two significant and obvious appeal issues that in all probability would have 
resulted in Mr. Tippett's convictions being overturned, (4) he willfully failed to comply 
with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by refusing to communicate with Mr. 
Tippett and to keep him apprized of the status of his case and (5) he failed to inform Mr. 
Tippett of the Appeals Court decision in his case which caused him to be time barred 
from filing for post-decision review. 
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two prong test with 
which to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To obtain reversal of a 
conviction based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel the defendant must prove 
(1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) 
that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial resulting in an unreliable or 
fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceedings. The same standard set forth in 
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Strickland applies to guilty plea challenges based upon claims of ineffectiveness. See 
Hall v. Lockhart 106 U. S., (1985). A defendant must show "that there is a reasonable 
probability that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial." Id. 
A. Allan Williams was ineffective due to this failure to present and 
adequately brief and present two major appeal issues causing them to be 
dismissed as being without merit. 
Mr. Tippett contends that Allan Williams failed to adequately brief and present 
two major appeal issues that if properly presented would have in all probability resulted 
in his convictions being overturned. These issues are that Mr. Tippett's trial counsel, 
Lance Wilkerson, was ineffective and that the trial court failed to ensure that Mr. Tippett 
understood the nature and element of the offense to which he was to plead guilty. Mr. 
Williams briefly mentioned these issues in the brief he prepared but he failed to provide 
any trial court citations, evidence, or case law to support this claim. Instead, Mr. 
Williams presented these issues more or less as a statement of facts rather than properly 
arguing them as appeal issues. It is well established in Utah that a reviewing court will 
not reach an issues that is inadequately briefed and supported. See State v. Wareham 772 
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) and State v. Amicone. 685 P.2d 1318, 1344 (Utah 1934). 
From an examination of Part 3 of the Second Brief of Appellant prepared by Allan 
Williams (Please see pages 10-12 of Second Brief of Appellant-Exhibit H), it can be seen 
that no trial record citations are provided, no case law was included or argued and no 
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evidence was presented to support the issue that trial counsel Lance Wilkerson was 
ineffective. Likewise, the same deficiencies can be seen with regard to the issue that the 
trial court failed to find that the Mr. Tippett understood the nature and the elements of the 
aggravating kidnaping and firearm enhancement offenses before accepting Mr. Tippett's 
guilty plea. (Please see pages 8-10 of Second Brief of Appellant-Exhibit H) Mr. Tippett 
contends that both of these issues are viable appeal issues that if properly presented would 
have resulted in the Court of Appeals overturning his conviction. The facts, evidence, 
record citations, and legal arguments in support of both of these issues are presented 
below. Mr. Tippett requests that this court examine the following argument of the issues 
in order to determine whether or not Allan Williams failed to properly and adequately 
present these issues for review. If this Court finds that Allan Williams failed to present 
these viable appeal issues in a proper and effective manner, then ineffectiveness must be 
presumed and the conviction overturned. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 35, 108 S. Ct. 
346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) and Dunn v. Cook 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990). 
For the following reasons Mr. Tippett contends that trial counsel Lance Wilkerson 
was ineffective. During the arraignment proceedings Mr. Wilkerson waived the reading 
of the charging information (See page 4, lines 18-22, of the Reporter's Transcript of 
Arraignment-Exhibit I) and then failed to object to a charging document that did not 
provide the names of or a description of the alleged victims. (See Information-Exhibit J) 
Utah Courts have long held that a complaint which fails to plead the names of, or at least 
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describe the persons injured is "fatally defective for failing to state a public offense." See 
State v. Wilson. 105 Utah 516, 143 P.2d 907 (1943). Mr. Wilkerson's failure to object to 
the State's charging document for failing to name or describe the victims was ineffective. 
Mr. Wilkerson's representation again proved ineffective in that during the plea 
process he failed to object to or correct the court's incomplete and incorrect explanation 
of the elements of the aggravated kidnaping offense. During the proceedings the Court 
stated; 
Q. (By the Court) You understand Mr. Tippett that you are charged with the 
crime of aggravated kidnaping in violation of 76-5-302. That's a first 
degree felony, which alleges that you at the time and date did take control 
of people and cause them to be transported against their will. You held 
them under your control against their will, and that in fact you did utilize a 
firearm in the commission of that offense . . . 
(See page 4, lines 23-35, and page 5, lines 1-5 of Reporter's Transcript of 
Arraignment-Exhibit I). 
The description offered by the court is not a legally correct or constitutionally 
adequate description of the offense of aggravated kidnaping. In fact, the Court's 
description more accurately describes the offense of kidnaping rather than aggravated 
kidnaping. The Court's explanation of the offense of aggravating kidnaping defines the 
charge of kidnaping but makes no mention of the circumstances that must be present to 
elevate a charge of kidnaping to that of aggravated kidnaping. Without the of intent to 
commit one of the aggravating factors Petitioner would only have been guilty of simple 
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kidnaping. Utah Code §76-5-302, Aggravated Kidnaping, states in pertinent part; 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the person intentionally or 
knowingly, without the authority of law and against the will of the victims by any means 
and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains or transports the victim with intent, 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as shield or hostage, or to 
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forebear from 
engaging in particular conduct, or, 
(b) To facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight 
after commission or attempted commission of a felony or, 
(c To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another, or, 
The explanation of the offense of aggravated kidnaping offered by the trial court 
was substantially different from that set forth in the statute and the trial court failed to 
include any alleged intent to commit one of the aggravating factors. Due to his failure to 
object to or to correct the trial court's inaccurate explanation of the crime of aggravated 
kidnaping, Mr. Wilkerson's assistance was clearly ineffective. 
In addition to his failure to object or correct the trial court's inaccurate description 
of the offense of aggravated kidnaping, Mr. Wilkerson also failed to assist the court in 
establishing the factual basis necessary for the court to accept Mr. Tippett's guilty plea. 
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the trial court is required to establish a factual basis that 
would support a guilty plea. See State v. Breckenridge. 658 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). The 
trial court failed to satisfy this requirement. Instead of establishing facts of the alleged 
offense committed by Mr. Tippett, the trial court simply recited the statutory description 
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of the crime. At no time did the court set forth any specific facts surrounding the incident 
for which Mr. Tippett was charged such as the date, time, and place where the alleged 
crime took place, nor did the trial court set forth the names of the alleged victims or 
provide a description of the alleged victims. Without establishing a factual basis for Mr. 
Tippett's guilty plea, the court may not accept a plea of guilty. Mr. Wilkerson was 
invested with a duty to protect the rights of his client as well as to assist the court in 
properly entering and accepting Mr. Tippett's guilty plea. Based on the trial court's 
failure to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea and Mr. Wilkerson's failure to assist 
the court in doing so or to object to the court's acceptance of the guilty plea without a 
sufficient factual basis, Mr. Wilkerson's performance fell below that of a reasonable 
objective standard and therefore he was ineffective. 
Most importantly, Mr. Wilkerson also failed to correct or object to the inaccurate 
and incomplete description of the minimum and maximum sentence that could be 
imposed for the firearm enhancement. Pursuant to Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, prior to the court accepting a guilty plea, the court must ensure that 
the defendant is aware of and understands the minimum and maximum sentence that can 
be imposed for a conviction of the crime to which the defendant is seeking to plead guilty 
as well as the possibility of the imposition of a consecutive sentence. In the present case 
the court failed to inform Mr. Tippett that the sentence for the firearm enhancement 
would be imposed as a consecutive sentence. In fact, at the arraignment hearing the trial 
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court stated that, "It also carries with it a firearm enhancement penalty of not less than 
one or up to five years on top of that." (See Page 7, lines 12-14 of the Reporter's 
Transcript of Arraignment-Exhibit I). The court's statement that the sentence for the 
firearm enhancement would be "on top of that" can hardly be construed to mean 
consecutive. Most individuals not familiar with criminal law or legal terminology would 
interpret the phrase "on top of that" to mean that the sentence would be "piggybacked" to 
the 15 to life sentence or would be served at the same time as the sentence for the 
aggravated kidnaping conviction. The statement "on top of that" is obviously not a very 
precise description or definition of a consecutive sentence. 
Further, at the time of sentencing, the court imposed a sentence of 5 to 10 years 
imprisonment to be served consecutively with the 15 to life sentence for the aggravated 
kidnaping conviction in direct contradiction to the 1 to 5 year enhancement described by 
the court at the arraignment hearing. Despite the fact that this sentence was in direct 
conflict with the firearm enhancement penalty described by the trial court at the 
arraignment hearing, Mr. Wilkerson neither attempted to correct the court or object to the 
imposition of the 5 to 10 year consecutive sentence. Prior to sentencing Mr. Tippett was 
not advised of the court's ability or intention to sentence him to 5 to 10 years for the 
firearm enhancement nor was it made clear to Mr. Tippett that this sentence would be 
imposed consecutively, meaning that they would be served one after the other, to the 
sentence for the aggravated kidnaping offense. Surely such an obvious error in the 
26 
sentencing procedures should have been objected to by Mr. Wilkerson. Yet, Mr. 
Wilkerson did not object or voice any concern with the sentence imposed by the court. 
During the sentencing proceedings Mr. Wilkerson failed to protect Mr. Tippett's 
right by failing to object to or correct the court's failure to enter written findings with 
regard to the imposition of the maximum sentence of 15 years to life for the aggravated 
kidnaping conviction. Mr. Tippett was sentenced under Utah Code §76-5-302 which 
mandates that a minimum sentence of 5, 10, or 15 years to life be imposed. Since one of 
these three mandatory sentences must be imposed, sentencing must take place pursuant to 
Utah Code §76-3-20 l(5)(a) and (d) which require that the sentencing judge enter written 
findings in connection with the imposition of the maximum sentence. Petitioner was 
sentenced to the maximum term without the entry of written findings by the trial judge. 
The failure of the court to enter written findings is a substantial and obvious defect. See 
Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272 (Utah App.1992). Mr. Wilkerson did not object to or 
attempt to correct this blatant error by the court, again demonstrating his ineffectiveness. 
In addition to the obvious failure of Mr. Wilkerson to object to numerous errors by 
the court in both the court's acceptance of Mr. Tippett's guilty plea and the sentencing 
proceedings, Mr. Tippett also contends that Mr. Wilkerson provided him with false 
information which improperly induced him into pleading guilty. Prior to the entry of his 
guilty plea, Mr. Wilkerson told Mr. Tippett that if he agreed to plead guilty he would be 
sent back to South Carolina after sentencing to serve his time and that any time served in 
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South Carolina would be counted as time served on his Utah conviction. It can be clearly 
seen by reviewing the record that Mr. Tippett was under this impression at the time he 
entered his guilty plea. At the arraignment Mr. Tippett stated, "I want to get sentenced to 
get back to South Carolina and start getting on the time." (See page 9, lines 13-14 of the 
Reporter's Transcript of Arraignment-Exhibit I). Mr. Wilkerson's offering of incorrect 
and misleading information which affected Mr. Tippett5s decision to plead guilty is a 
clear violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the attorney client relationship. 
The Appellant now turns to prong two of the Strickland test. The second prong of-
Strickland can be met if Mr. Tippett can demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability 
that but for counsel errors he would not have pled guilty but instead would have insisted 
on going to trial. See Laylock v. State of New Mexico. 880 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th 
Cir.1989). In addition, he must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." United States v. Smith. 
10 f.2d 724, 728 (10th Cir.1993). In this case the trial record is clear as to what transpired 
during the court proceedings. The court committed several errors, as outlined above, that 
rendered Mr. Tippett's guilty plea unknowing and involuntary, and not once did Mr. 
Wilkerson object to or attempt to correct the obvious mistakes. Both Wilkerson and the 
trial court allowed Mr. Tippett to plead guilty to the crime of aggravated kidnaping 
without establishing a factual basis to support such a plea. Moreover, when all of the 
errors and omissions are taken as a whole, it is obvious that Mr. Tippett did not fully 
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understand the nature and elements of the crime to which he pled guilty nor did he fully 
understand the consequences of his plea, the minimum and maximum sentence that could 
be imposed for his conviction, or the consecutive nature of the firearm enhancement. The 
record indicates that Mr. Tippett's main motivation for entering a guilty plea was his 
belief that he would be returned to South Carolina to serve out his sentence there. If he 
had been fully and properly advised by his counsel it is reasonable to believe that he 
would not have plead guilty but rather would have insisted that the matter go to trial. 
Therefore Mr. Tippett also satisfies the second prong of the Strickland test. 
B. Allan Williams was ineffective due to the fact that he improperly and 
against the will of the Mr. Tippett changed the factual and theoretical 
substance of a viable appeal issue causing it to be dismissed as being 
without merit. 
Mr. Tippett contends that Allan Williams changed the factual and theoretical 
substance of valid appeal issues which caused it to be dismissed as being dismissed 
without merit. The issue in question is Mr. Tippett's contention that the State's charging 
document was fatally defective for failing to allege an offense. This issue is a 
jurisdictional defect not waived by the defendant's guilty plea. See U.S. v Lopez. 704 
F.2d 1383 N3, (5th Cir.1983) cert denied 464 U.S. 935 (1984). This issues was presented 
as a jurisdictional defect in Mr. Tippett's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea however 
against his instruction and without his knowledge Allan Williams changed the theoretical 
substance of this argument to read, "the plea was improperly taken because the 
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information did not adequately inform the defendant/appellant of the nature of the 
charges." (See Second Brief of Appellant, Point II-Exhibit H). The argument presented 
by Williams is simply not viable because when entering a plea of guilty a defendant 
waives all legal challenges to sufficiency. On the other hand, a jurisdictional defect in the 
charging document is an issue that can be raised at any time during the proceedings. See 
U.S. v OberskL 334 F.2d 1034, 1036 (5th Cir.) cert denied 460 U.S.(1984) and U.S. v. 
Esposito. 711 F.2d 283, 288 (7th Cir.1985). For some reason known only to him, Allan 
Williams decided to change the theoretical substance of this argument to such an extent 
that it had no chance in succeeding. The Appellant sets forth the factual and legal 
argument of this issue below and moves this court to review the issue as presented to 
determine whether the possibility exists that if the issue were properly presented a 
decision in Mr. Tippett's favor may have resulted. If this court so determines, then 
ineffective assistance of counsel must be presumed. See Gray v. Green, 778 F.2d 350 (7th 
Cir.1985) and Griffin v. Aiken. 775 F.2d 1220, 1235-36 (4th Cir.1985). 
From an examination of the State's charging document (See Attached Information-
Exhibit J) it can be seen that despite defining the crime of aggravated kidnaping, the 
charging document does not set forth any specific facts on which to base the charge of 
aggravated kidnaping, therefore the State's charging document is defective. See State v. 
Topham. 41 Utah 39, 123 P.2d 388 (1912). In addition to failing to allege any specific 
facts that would support the charge, the State's charging document also fails to name the 
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alleged victims or provide a description of the alleged victims. It has been long held in 
Utah that when a crime charged is against another person, the charging document must 
describe or plead the name of the person(s) injured, and a failure to do so renders the 
charging document "fatally defective" and does "not state a public offense." See State v. 
Wilson. 105 Utah 516, 143 P.2d 907 (1943). In the present case, the offense for which 
Mr. Tippett had been charged involved an offense against another person and therefore 
due to the State's failure to name the alleged victim or at least describe the victim in the 
State's charging document, the charging document must be determined to be "fatally 
defective" for "failing to allege an offense." 
A charging document which fails to allege an offense is a jurisdictional defect that 
is not waived by a plea of guilty. See U.S. v Lopez. 704 F.2d 1382, 1385 N3 (5th 
Cir.1983) cert denied U.S. 935 (1984); U.S. v. DiFonzo. 603 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th 
Cir.1979) cert denied 444 U.S. 1018 (1980), and can be challenged at any stage of the 
proceedings, either before or after conviction. See U.S. v Oberski. 334 F.2d 1034, 1036 
(5th Cir.) cert denied 460 U.S.(1984) and U.S. v. Esposito. 711 F.2d 283, 288 (7th 
Cir.1985). 
The issue that the State's charging document was fatally defective for failing to 
allege an offense is a viable appeal issue that should be decided in Mr. Tippett's favor. 
Likewise, the court should find that if this issue had been properly presented by Allan 
Williams in Mr. Tippett's appeal, the court would have in all probability overturned his 
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conviction. As such, ineffectiveness by Mr. Williams must be presumed. 
C. Allan Williams was ineffective due to his failure to brief and present 
two significant and obvious appeal issues that in all probability would have 
resulted in Mr. Tippett's convictions being overturned. 
Mr. Tippett contends that Allan Williams failed to present two significant and 
obvious issues that were originally raised in his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. These 
two issues that were omitted are (1) that the trial court failed to advise Mr. Tippett that the 
firearm enhancement penalty would be imposed as a consecutive sentence and (2) that the 
trial court failed to establish a factual basis as is required before the court accepted the his 
guilty plea. Both of these issues are viable appeal issues and if properly presented, would 
in all probability resulted in Mr. Tippett5s conviction being overturned. 
In Gray v. Green. 778 F.2d 350 (7th Cir.1985), the 7th Circuit Court held that "if 
appellant counsel has failed to raise a significant and obvious appeal issues, failure could 
be viewed as a deficient performance" and "if the issue not raised may have resulted in 
reversal of conviction, or an order for a new trial, the failure was prejudicial. If the 
appellant argues that appellate counsel failed to raise viable issues, the court must 
examine the trial record to determine whether appellate counsel failed to present 
significant and obvious issues." I& At 372. 
Pursuant to Rule 11(e)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court 
has an obligation to advise the defendant of the possibility of imposition of a consecutive 
sentence. The court's failure to do so renders the guilty plea unknowing and thus 
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involuntary. See State V. Vasilacopulus. 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App.1988). Rule 11(e)(5) 
states in pertinent part: 
(e) The court . . . shall not accept a plea of guilty until the court has made the 
findings: 
(5) that the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentences that 
may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences. 
In the present case, the trial court not only stated incorrectly the minimum and 
maximum sentence that could be imposed for the firearm enhancement but also failed to 
clearly explain that the firearm enhancement penalty would be imposed consecutive to the 
sentence for the aggravated kidnaping conviction. In determining whether or not the trial 
court complied with Rule 11(e) the court must use the standard in effect at the time Mr. 
Tippett's guilty plea was entered. The standard at the time of the entry of the guilty plea 
was the Warner-Brooks standard which requires that the court record as a whole 
demonstrate that the trial court had substantially complied. 
During the arraignment hearing, the trial court improperly stated that Mr. Tippett 
faced a sentence of five years to life for the aggravated kidnaping charge. Only after the 
prosecuting attorney made the court aware of its error did the court inform Mr. Tippett 
that he faced a sentence of five, ten, or fifteen years to life. The court offered no further 
information to explain the indeterminate nature of these sentences. This fact is of 
importance in this case due to the fact that the Mr. Tippett was originally from the state of 
South Carolina where the courts do not use an indeterminate sentence approach. Due to 
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the court's failure to explain the indeterminate nature of the sentence, Mr. Tippett did not 
fully understand the minimum and maximum sentence that could be imposed for his 
conviction. Thus, it should be found that the trial court did not comply with Rule 11(e) 
and violated Mr. Tippett5s right to Due Process by failing to ensure that he fully 
understood the minimum and maximum sentence that could be imposed prior to accepting 
his guilty plea. 
In addition to failing to ensure that Mr. Tippett fully understood the minimum and 
maximum sentence that could be imposed, the court also failed to clearly advise him as to 
the possibility of the imposition of a consecutive sentence for the firearm enhancement. 
As argued earlier, the trial court judge stated that "It also carries with it a firearm 
enhancement penalty of not less than one or up to five years on top of that." The court's 
statement is not clear in advising Mr. Tippett that the firearm enhancement penalty may 
be imposed "consecutively" to the sentence for the aggravated kidnaping conviction. 
The court's statement that the sentence for the firearm enhancement would be "on top of 
that" can hardly be construed to mean consecutive. This statement is misleading and 
confusing to say the least. The trial court failed to find that Mr. Tippett fully understood 
the consequences of his guilty plea and the consecutive nature of the firearm 
enhancement penalty. Therefore the court did not comply with Rule 11(e) in taking the 
Mr. Tippett's guilty plea and as such he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. 
The trial court failed to establish a factual basis for Mr. Tippett's guilty plea. The 
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Utah Supreme Court in State v. Breckenridge established that before accepting a guilty 
plea, a trial court must first develop a factual basis which would support a conviction for 
the offense alleged. See State v. Breckenridge. 658 p.2d 440 (Utah 1983).2 In 
Breckenridge, the court concluded that even though the plea colloquy did include a 
recitation of the surrounding facts, as a matter of law those facts were insufficient to 
support a conviction. Id. at 442-444. In the present case, the plea colloquy contains no 
recitation of any alleged facts surrounding the incident for which Mr. Tippett had been 
charged with two counts of aggravated kidnaping with a firearm enhancement. During 
the arraignment proceedings the trial court judge stated: 
Q-(By the Court) You understand Mr. Tippett that you are charged with the 
crime of aggravated kidnaping in violation of §76-5-302. That's a first 
degree felony which alleges that at the time and place did take control of 
people and cause them to be transported against their will, and that in fact 
you did utilize a firearm in the commission of that offense. 
The court's statement is nothing more than an incomplete recitation of §76-5-302. 
The trial court failed to provide any information of facts regarding the alleged crime. The 
court did not state the date, time, or location where the alleged offense occurred, nor did it 
state the names of or describe the alleged victims. In fact, the court does not even state 
how many victims were involved. In short, the trial court did not advert to any facts that 
could form a basis for a conviction. That failure by the trial court is both critical and 
2
 The Rules of Practice in effect in the Utah District Courts at the time the 
Petitioner's guilty plea was entered also required the court to find "that there is a factual 
basis for the plea." Rules of Practice, Rule 3.6(c). 
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prejudicial because there is nothing else in the record that cures this defect.3 
Before accepting a guilty plea a trial court is required to determine that there is 
enough evidence from which a jury could find a defendant guilty. See State v. Rhode. 56 
Wash.App. 69, 782 P.2d 567, 569 (1989). The trial court in the present case did not meet 
this standard. The State proffered no evidence or testimony that could have supported a 
verdict that Mr. Tippett was guilty of the crime of aggravated kidnaping. Thus, this Court 
cannot be satisfied that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary because the record 
when taken as a whole is insufficient to remedy the defects of the plea proceedings. 
Therefore, the trial court should permit Mr. Tippett to withdraw his guilty plea. See 
Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989) cert denied sub nom. Jolivet v. Barnes. 493 
U.S. 1033, HOS.Ct. 751, 107 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990). 
D. Allan Williams was ineffective due to his failure to comply with the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants the right to the assistance of counsel. In Utah, the Rules of Professional 
Conduct serve as a guideline for both the ethical standards and conduct of attorneys. 
While a violation of the Rules does not "create 
any presumption that a legal duty has been 
breached" or provide a basis for civil liability, 
Scope, Utah R.Prof.Conduct, courts have referred 
to the Rules to augment legal principles 
3
 No plea affidavit was taken by the court and the state's charging document failed 
to provide any facts surrounding the alleged offense. 
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involving lawyer conduct. The application of 
ethical standards to particular facts is a 
questions of law. See Hobson. 672 F.2d at 828. 
Counsel's conduct may be examined in light of prevailing professional and 
ethical standards to determine whether defendant received effective 
representation. Zepp. 748 F.2d at 135. 
State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484 (UtahCt.App. 1991)(citing United States v. 
Hobson. 672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 906, 103 S.Ct. 208, 74 
L.Ed.2d 166 (1982) and Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp. 748 F.2d 125 (3rd 
Cir. 1984)). (See attached copy of State v. Johnson- Exhibit K) 
Thus, an attorneys performance can be judged in part by his adherence to the Rules 
of Professional Conduct. Allan Williams violated numerous Rules of Professional 
Conduct in his representation of Mr. Tippett but most importantly he violated Rules 1.2 
Scope of Representation and 1.4 Communication. Rule 1.2 states in pertinent part that: 
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation, subject to paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and shall consult with the 
client as to the means by which they are pursued.... 
(b) A lawyer may limit the objectives of representation if the client consents 
after consultation. 
Upon being appointed to represent Mr. Tippett in his appeal, Allan Williams met 
with the Petitioner at which time Mr. Tippett outlined the issues he wanted Mr. Williams 
to include in his appeal brief. Mr. Williams agreed that he would draft the appeal brief to 
include the issues outlined by Mr. Tippett and agreed to provide him with a copy of the 
brief prior to filing it so that he would have an opportunity to review the brief and make 
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suggestions. Despite agreeing to do so, Mr. Williams did not provide Mr. Tippett with a 
copy of the brief prior to filing it nor did he provide him with a copy after he filed it. 
Mr. Tippett did not receive a copy of the brief until he was provided with one by 
the Court of Appeals. Upon reviewing the brief, the Mr. Tippett discovered that 
numerous issues Mr. Williams agreed to include had been omitted and the factual and 
theoretical basis of one appeal issue had been altered. The omissions and alterations of 
appeal issues was done without the knowledge or consent of Mr. Tippett. Mr. Tippett 
was under the impression that Mr. Williams was preparing a brief which included the 
issues he had discussed with Mr. Williams during their brief visit. At no time did Mr. 
Williams consult with Mr. Tippett after the initial visit to discuss the issues to be included 
or omitted from the appeal brief nor did he provide any explanation for his deviation from 
the issues he had originally agreed to include in the brief. 
Mr. Williams violation of Rule 1.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for his 
failure to follow the directions of Mr. Tippett in preparing his appeal was further 
compounded by Mr. Williams' refusal to communicate with Mr. Tippett. As set forth 
above, in the two years that Mr. Williams acted as Mr. Tippett's appellate counsel, he 
visited with Mr. Tippett in person only twice and by phone on only two or three 
occasions. The visit and the phone conversations were very brief. Additionally, Mr. 
Williams also failed to keep phone conference appointments scheduled for him by his 
secretary and failed to respond to Mr. Tippett's letters on all but two occasions. Rule 1.4 
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of the Rules of Professional Conduct states that: 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
enable the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
Allan Williams clearly violated Rule 1.4 during his representation of Mr. Tippett. 
Mr. Williams failed to communicate with Mr. Tippett and failed to keep him reasonably 
informed about the status of his case. Mr. Williams did not consult with Mr. Tippett prior 
to the filing of the appeal brief, and in fact did not even notify him that the brief had been 
filed. He did not provide Mr. Tippett with a copy of the appeal brief after it had been 
filed and had it not been for the Court of Appeals, Mr. Tippett may never have received a 
copy of the brief. Obviously it is reasonable for Mr. Tippett to expect that he would be 
notified when the appeal brief had been filed and his request for a copy of the brief is a 
reasonable request. Nonetheless, Mr. Williams failed to maintain reasonable 
communication with Mr. Tippett. 
Even more damaging than his failure to inform Mr. Tippett of the filing of his brief 
or to provide him with a copy, was Mr. Williams failure to inform Mr. Tippett that a 
decision had been reached in his case. On October 3, 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals 
issued a Memorandum Decision affirming the denial of Mr. Tippett's Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea. Despite the fact that the Utah Court of Appeals had rendered its 
decision on October 3, 1996, Mr. Tippett was totally unaware of the court's decision and 
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was under the impression that his case was set for oral argument. Mr. Tippett was 
notified of the court's decision only after he wrote a letter to the Court of Appeals 
requesting a copy of the State's Response Brief. At no time had Mr. Williams notified 
Mr. Tippett of the court's decision nor had he provided Mr. Tippett with a copy of the 
decision. In fact, Mr. Tippett had made numerous attempts to contact Mr. Williams to 
discuss the status of the appeal and the upcoming oral argument (it was Mr. Tippett's 
belief that his case was to be set for oral argument) but Mr. Williams failed to respond to 
any of Mr. Tippett's communications. It was not until he received a letter from the Court 
of Appeals dated January 13, 1997 along with a copy of the court's Memorandum 
Decision that Mr. Tippett became aware that his case had been decided. Mr. Williams' 
failure to notify the Petitioner proved to be the single most damaging effect of Mr. 
Williams' failure to communicate with Mr. Tippett. The fact that Mr. Williams did not 
notify Mr. Tippett of the court's decision caused him to be time barred from petitioning 
the court for a re-hearing or to Petition the Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiari since the 
thirty day time limit in which one must do so had already passed before Mr. Tippett was 
even made aware that a decision had been reached. 
During his testimony at the Evidentiary hearing held on September 23, 1998, Mr. 
Williams testified that he had directed his secretary to send Mr. Tippett a copy of the 
decision along with a letter stating that he had only a certain time to respond if he wished 
to file a petitioner for rehearing or Petition for Certiari. Mr. Williams further testified that 
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he was not sure if the letter and decision were ever sent and that he did not follow up with 
Mr. Tippett as to whether he wished to file any such petitions. Mr. Williams also testified 
at that hearing that it was his opinion that the Court of Appeals had "made the wrong 
decision". If Mr. Williams had such strong feelings that the Court of Appeals had erred 
in its decision, it would be expected that he make a diligent effort to discuss with Mr. 
Tippett the possibility of filing a Petition for Rehearing of Petition for Certiari. Due to 
the strict time constraints involved it would also be reasonable to expect that Mr. 
Williams make the trip to the prison to meet with Mr. Tippett personally to discuss the 
court's decision and the possible remedies. But, the only effort Mr. Williams claims to 
have made was to direct his secretary to write Mr. Tippett a letter and to send him a copy 
of the decision. This request was not taken and Mr. Tippett was not provided with a copy 
of the decision nor was he provided notice that a decision had been reached. 
Mr. Williams' violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct clearly demonstrates 
that his performance fell well below the reasonable standard of representation. Further, 
Mr. Williams' failure to communicate with Mr. Tippett and to keep him apprized of the 
status of his case was extremely prejudicial to his case and resulted in Mr. Tippett being 
precluded from petitioning the court for a rehearing or from seeking further review of the 
Court of Appeals decision by the Utah Supreme Court. Thus, both prongs of the 
Strickland test have been met. Therefore it must be presumed that Mr. Williams 
representation was ineffective. 
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E. Allan Williams was ineffective due to his failure to petition the Court of 
Appeals for a rehearing and for failing to inform the Petitioner of the 
Appeals Court decision in his case which caused him to be time barred from 
filing for post-decision review. 
Mr. Tippett contends that Mr. Williams was ineffective for failing to petition the 
Court of Appeals for a rehearing when it was obvious that the court had failed to consider 
a material point in the case, which if addressed would have drastically effected the court's 
decision. Additionally, Mr. Tippett contends that he was further prejudiced by Mr. 
Williams' failure to inform him that the Court of Appeals had reached a decision in his 
case. The Utah Court of Appeals, in their memorandum decision concluded that "the trial 
court failed to inform the defendant of the maximum sentence that could have been 
imposed upon him by reason of the firearm enhancement," and that "the trial court was 
not in substantial compliance with Utah R.Crim.P. 11 on that point." (See Court of 
Appeals Decision-Exhibit L) However, in reaching that decision, the Utah Court of 
Appeals failed to consider the fact that the trial court had also never informed Mr. Tippett 
of the possibility of the imposition of a consecutive sentence for the firearm enhancement 
as is required by Rule 11(e)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
That requirement is mandated by statute and required by law. See State V. 
Vasilacopulus. 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App.1988) and Boykin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238, 243-
44 (1969). However, in this case the trial court failed to satisfy this requirement. At no 
time before sentencing did the trial court inform Mr. Tippett that he would receive a 
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consecutive sentence for the firearm enhancement conviction. The arraignment court 
stated, "It also carries with it a firearm enhancement penalty of not less than one year or 
up to five on top of that." The court failed to explain or describe the consecutive nature 
of the firearm enhancement penalty. At sentencing, the court sentenced Mr. Tippett to a 
consecutive term of 5 to 10 years for the firearm enhancement. Mr. Tippett was never 
given any advance notice that the firearm enhancement penalty would be imposed 
consecutively. In short, even after the Court of Appeals modified his sentence for the 
firearm enhancement the conviction is still in violation of Rule 11(e)(5) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure in that the defendant was not informed of or fully understood of 
the consecutive nature of the firearm enhancement penalty. See State V. Vasilacopulus. 
756 P.2d 92 (Utah App.1988). 
The fact of the consecutive sentence issue should have been obvious to the Court 
of Appeals at the time of their decision to modify the sentence for the firearm 
enhancement conviction. This issue had been raised in Mr. Tippett's Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea which should have been examined by the court prior to making its decision. 
Moreover, the trial court's failure in that respect is obvious on the face of the record. The 
trial court's failure can be easily and clearly seen in the transcript of the arraignment 
hearing. The facts of this case demonstrate a clear need for a rehearing in order to allow 
the Court of Appeals an opportunity to correct the improper decision which resulted from 
the Court of Appeals failure to consider a material of fact when making its decision, that 
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fact being that the trial court failed to inform Mr. Tippett of the consecutive nature of the 
firearm enhancement and to ensure that he understood the consecutive nature of the 
firearm enhancement penalty prior to accepting his guilty plea. 
The need for a rehearing should also have been obvious to Mr. Williams, 
especially in light of the fact that Mr. Williams had discussed with Mr. Tippett the 
possible actions the Court of Appeals could take with regard to the consecutive sentence 
issue. That discussion took place several months before the Appeals Court decision and 
covered the possibility of a sentence modification without the court addressing the 
consecutive sentence issue. During that discussion both Mr. Williams and Mr. Tippett 
agreed that if the Court of Appeals failed to consider all of the facts of the consecutive 
sentence issue, post-decision review would be an appropriate and needed remedy. 
Upon receiving a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, Mr. Williams failed to 
notify Mr. Tippett of the decision or to provide him with a copy. Petitioner did not 
receive a copy of the court's decision until one had been provided to him by the Court of 
Appeals clerk nearly 3 XA months after the decision had been issued. After reviewing a 
copy of the Court of Appeals decision, Mr. Tippett prepared a Pro Se Petition for 
Rehearing raising the issues that 1) Williams had provided ineffective assistance on 
appeal (2) that the Court of Appeals filed to fully consider the trial court's failure to 
advise Mr. Tippett of the consecutive nature of the firearm enhancement penalty when 
reaching the decision to modify the sentence (3) that Mr. Williams had omitted several 
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meritorious appeal issues from his brief, and requesting that the court accept his Petition 
for Rehearing despite the fact that it was filed after the thirty day time limit for filing it 
had lapsed due to the fact that Mr. Williams had failed to inform him of the court's 
decision. The Court of Appeals refused to accept the Pro Se Petition for Rehearing based 
on the fact that it was untimely and that jurisdiction had been returned to the trial court. 
Mr. Williams failure to notify Mr. Tippett of the court's decision resulted in him 
losing his opportunity to petition the court for a rehearing. Mr. Williams was clearly 
ineffective. There is no possible tactic or strategic reason that would explain Mr. 
Williams' failure to petition the court for a rehearing. Mr. Williams had nothing to lose 
by filing a petition for rehearing and had everything to gain for his client. Mr. Williams 
had clearly been aware of the possibility that this issue may come up and that a petition 
for rehearing may be necessary. Mr. Williams violated both constitutional law and his 
duty to his client when he failed to file a petition for rehearing. The resulting effect of 
this failure is that Mr. Tippett is imprisoned under a constitutionally defective sentence. 
3) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REAPPOINTING ALLAN WILLIAMS 
DESPITE NOTIFICATION BY PETITIONER THAT A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
EXISTED AND WITHOUT MAKING THE PROPER INQUIRY INTO THE 
POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST. 
The United States Supreme Court has declared that "[Wjhere a constitutional right 
to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to 
representation that is free from conflict's of interest." Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 
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271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1103, 67 L.Ed.2d. 220 (1981). A court has a limited duty to avoid 
potential conflicts of interest. Cuyler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 
1718, 64 L.Ed.2d. 333 (1980). The Court must initiate an inquiry if it knows or 
reasonably should know that a potential conflict exists. Id. at 347. When the trial court 
has notice of a potential conflict but fails to make a sufficient inquiry into the alleged 
conflict, the reviewing court will presume a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. Id. at 348. See also Holloway v. Arkansas. 435 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1978). 
The facts in this case are very clear. Mr. Tippett notified both the trial court and 
the Court of Appeals of the fact that Allan Williams was laboring under a conflict of 
interest due to the time constraints, inadequate compensation, and duty to other clients. 
However, neither court conducted the required inquiry and therefore a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel must be presumed. On July 5, 1995, Mr. Tippett 
mailed to the Court of Appeals a copy of Notice of Dismissal of Counsel in which he 
stated that Mr. Williams was dismissed from his case due to a conflict of interest. Then 
on September 17, 1995, Mr. Tippett filed a Motion for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Determination and to Withdraw Appeal Brief in which he contended that Mr. Williams's 
representation on appeal was ineffective due to an actual conflict of interest. In fact there 
are several other documents filed with both courts that raised the issue of a conflict of 
interest as well as numerous letters from Mr. Tippett to the courts outlining the conflict of 
interest that had arisen and which was preventing Mr. Williams from effectively 
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representing him in his appeal. 
Despite having been provided notice of the conflict of interest by Mr. Tippett on 
numerous occasions, neither court conducted a hearing before Mr. Williams was 
reappointed to Mr. Tippett's case. Mr. Tippett did everything in his power to notify the 
courts of the potential conflict of interest but without conducting a proper inquiry the trial 
court in effect forced Mr. Tippett to accept Mr. Williams as his counsel. The 
reappointment of Mr. Williams subsequent to his dismissal by Mr. Tippett was done 
without his knowledge and against his will. The trial court issued a Ruling on June 26, 
1996, reappointing Allan Williams as counsel for Mr. Tippett and stating that the 
"Petitioner/Defendant in a case like this can not complain of or select his own counsel." 
The trial court's Ruling in effect denied Mr. Tippett his Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. 
From the evidence and facts of this issues it is clear that Mr. Tippett alerted both 
the trial court and the Court of Appeals to the potential conflict of interest involving Mr. 
Williams representation of Mr. Tippett on appeal. Neither court conducted a proper 
inquiry before the trial court reassigned Mr. Williams to Mr. Tippett's case simply 
because there was a shortage of other local attorneys available to represent him. 
Therefore this reviewing court must presume a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
the effective assistance of counsel. See Cuyler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 347. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ENTER WRITTEN 
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FINDINGS NECESSARY TO DETERMINATION OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL CLAIM AS REQUIRED BY RULE 23 B OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the trial court 
enter written findings when making a determination with regard to a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. In the present case, after being remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of ineffective assistance and after having held an evidentiary hearing on the 
matter, the trial court entered a two sentence Ruling denying the Appellant's Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief and for Determination of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The 
trial court's ruling is clearly in violation of Rule 23B in that the trial court failed to enter 
the necessary written findings. As such, the Appellant requests that this court "make an 
independent determination of [the] trial court's conclusions" pursuant to the Supreme 
Court's ruling in State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
The Appellant requests that this court hear oral argument on this matter and further 
requests that the Appellant be transported from the Utah State Prison, where he is 
currently incarcerated, to the Utah Court of Appeals so that he may be present at oral 
arguments. The Appellant also requests that the court enter a formal written decision in 
this matter and that the decision be published. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the evidence and argument presented above, Appellant has clearly 
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demonstrated that Mr. Williams was ineffective due to the fact that he was laboring under 
a conflict of interest that adversely affected his representation and prejudiced the 
Appellant's case. In addition to the conflict of interest, Mr. Williams was generally 
ineffective in that (1) he failed to present and adequately brief and present two major 
appeal issues causing them to be dismissed as being without merit, (2) he improperly and 
against the will of the Appellant changed the factual and theoretical substance of a viable 
appeal issue causing it to be dismissed as being without merit, (3) he failed to brief and 
present two significant and obvious appeal issues that in all probability would have 
resulted in Appellant's convictions being overturned, (4) he willfully failed to comply 
with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by refusing to communicate with the 
Appellant and to keep him apprized of the status of his case and (5) he failed to inform 
the Appellant of the Appeals Court decision in his case which caused him to be time 
barred from filing for post-decision review. Finally, the trial court erred in reappointing 
Mr. Williams to represent the Appellant. The trial court failed to conduct the necessary 
inquiry into the potential conflict of interest after having been notified of the conflict by 
the Appellant on numerous occasions. 
The cumulative effect of the trial court's error and the ineffectiveness of Mr. 
Williams served to prejudice the Appellant's case resulting in the denial of his Appeal of 
his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and his conviction being affirmed. To be entitled to 
a writ, a petitioner must show that there was an obvious injustice or a substantial and 
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prejudicial denial of a constitutional right. Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029, 1034-35 (Utah 
1989). "The unusual circumstances test was intended to assure fundamental fairness and 
to require reexamination of a conviction or habeas corpus when the nature of the alleged 
error was such that it would be unconscionable not to reexamine . . . and thereby to assure 
that substantial justice [was] done . . . " Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1115 (Utah 
1983) (Stewart, J. concurring) (quoting Martinez v. Smith. 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 
1979), Brown v. Turner. 21 Utah 2d 96, 99, 440 P.2d 968, 969-70 (1968). Clearly this 
case involved the denial of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Right to the effective assistance 
of counsel and the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Appellant's Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief and for Determination of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
THEREFORE based on the evidence and argument set forth above, the Petitioner 
respectfully requests that this court make an independent determination that Petitioner's 
appellate counsel, Allan Williams, was ineffective, that counsel's ineffectiveness 
prejudiced Appellant's case, and enter written findings of the same. Appellant further 
requests that based upon appellate counsel's ineffectiveness, the court enter an order 
reinstating his appeal of the order denying his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and 
appoint new counsel to represent him in his appeal. 
DATED this , j g daY o f g ^ W _ ^ 1 9 9 9-
JLIE GEORGE 
"Attorney for Appellant 
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